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After Settlement, in Respect of Claims
Previously Undisclosed*
By JOSEPH O'MEAP-A, JR.
When the time comes to make good on a life insurance
policy, must the insurer bestir itself to ascertain whether there
be outstanding interests, presently unknown to it, which, if
asserted, it would ignore at its peril; or may it safely make
payment without delay to the person entitled thereto according
to its own records?
At Maturity
This question is encountered every time a policy matures.
It is always open to a displaced beneficiary to contend that, in
making the policy payable to another, the insured acted under
duress or without sufficient mental capacity;' it is always possi-
ble that some act or transaction of the insured has given rise
to an adverse interest. Must the company investigate? To do
so would entail a heavy burden and put a brake on the prompt
payment of claims to the disadvantage of policyholders gen-
erally, and this without any corresponding advantage sufficient
to compensate for the delay, inconvenience and expense, for
it may be assumed, I think, that in the great majority of cases
the results of such inquiry would be negative.
The cases impose no such onerous conditions. In the ab-
sence of circumstances calling for inquiry no duty rests upon
the insurer to search for undisclosed interests and possible
adverse claims--settlement with the payee of record is a com-
plete defense (i) as against a former beneficiary subsequently
* Address given before legal section of the American Life Convention at
its meeting in Chicago in October 1940.
t Member Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio, Bars.
' For a Note on the cancellation of a change of beneficiary for mistake or
incapacity of the insured, or fraud or undue influence on the part of the
substituted beneficiary, see (1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. 136.
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contending that the substitution of the successor beneficiary was
accomplished by fraud or undue influence or that the insured
was incompetent at the time;2 (2) as against anyone claiming
an interest, by assignment or otherwise, who does not give
notice of his claim until after settlement has been made.8
Transactions before Maturity
The question is likewise present every time the insured
invokes the provisions of his policy to obtain a loan or the
surrender value, for (i) he may be incompetent, or (2) he may
have pledged his policy or assigned it or contracted not to
change the beneficiary.
i. Transactions of one mentally incompetent, while under
guardianship, are almost uniformly regarded as void.' Trans-
actions entered into prior to adjudication of incompetency are
likewise considered void in some jurisdictions and uncondi-
tionally voidable in others; but, according to the weight of
authority, if fairly made by the other party, without notice of
the incompetent's mental condition, executed transactions will
not be set aside unless the status quo ante can be restored and
an offer is made to restore it.' There is, however, substantial
authority for upholding executed transactions supported by an
adequate consideration and entered into by the other party in
'State Life Ins. Co. v. Coffrini, 285 Fed. 56o (C.C.A. 3 d, 1922);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bramlett, 224 Ala. 473, 140 So. 752 (932);
see Bosworth v. Wolfe, 146 Wash. 615, 264 Pac. 413, 56 A.L.R. 1117
(1928).
" Bennett v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 22o Iowa 927, 263 N.W. z 5(1935); Shaw v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2O Conn. 633, i8z
Ad. 472 (1936); Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 373 Ill. 256, 76 N.E. (zd)
114 (1940); Kot v. Chrysler Corp., 293 Mich. 688, 292 N.W. 531 (940);
7 COUCH, INSURANCE, Sec. 1867, pp. 6215-16; see Wannamaker v. Stroman,
167 S.Car. 484, 166 S.E. 6z2 (1932).
4 Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jago, 28o Mich. 360, 273 N.W. 599
(1937); see Note, Thse Agreements of Insaz e Persons (1932) 32 CoL.L.REv.
504, 5o9. As to admissibility and probative force, on issue of mental condi-
tion, of evidence of adjudication of incompetency or insanity, or confinement
in insane asylum, see Notes (1920) 7 A.L.R. 568, (93o) 68 A.L.R. 1309.
" See Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 504, 507; Notes (1927) 46 A.L.R.
416, (1935) 95 A.L.R. 1442.
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good faith and without notice of the incompetency.6 This latter
view is reflected in a number of recent cases to the general
effect that an insurer is ordinarily under no duty to inquire into
the competency of its insured and that a transaction respecting
his policy, entered into in good faith and without notice of the
insured's mental condition, cannot later be upset either by or
on behalf of the insured or by any other claimant!
These cases seem to me to be soundly based. In support
of that opinion I call attention to the following considerations:
(a) When an insurance company makes a policy loan or pays
out the surrender value, it does not enter into a contract which
it is free to make or not as it pleases. On the contrary, in
extending the loan or handing over the cash value it merely
discharges a duty imposed upon it by the insured's exercise of
a power acquired by him under the terms of his policy-
acquired long since, in fact, for the policy must be at least two
years old and very likely is much older.
(b) In practice this duty must be fulfilled by the insurer
without inquiry into the mental state of its insured. As in the
case of banks paying the checks of their depositors, there is no
real opportunity for investigation. The business is too extensive
and its volume too great. If it is to be transacted smoothly,
economically and to the satisfaction of policyholders (who fre-
quently need their money in a hurry) no more is feasible than
a routine check of what appears on the surface.
(c) It is certainly pertinent, moreover, that the terms of
the loan or surrender are not fixed by bargaining with the
insured but are settled in the policy whose provisions, as regards
these and other matters, must conform to statutory require-
ments. Accordingly, when an incompetent borrows on his
" See Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 504, 507; BRADY, BANK CHECKS
(zd ed., 1926) Sec. 2o5.
7New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So.
'5', 59 A.L.R. 1075 (1928); Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
187 S. Car. 103, 196 S.E. 519 (1938); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Welch,
195 So. 554 (Ala., 1940); cf. Walters v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 64 Fed. (2d)
178 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1933).
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policy or turns it in for the cash value, he gets exactly the same
as anyone else, neither more nor less; and he gets it by virtue
of an antecedent unilateral contract under which he has no
obligations.
These considerations, I submit, cannot reasonably be
ignored; and there may be some ground for supposing they
will exert an increasing influence in the future.
A large measure of protection is already afforded under
the view currently prevailing in most jurisdictions which, as
noted above, requires that the status quo ante must be restored.
In these jurisdictions the danger of actual loss by the insurer
is slight; although, of course, if the beneficiary is permitted
to avoid the transaction after the insured's death,8 there may
be an opportunity for second-guessing against the company.
2. The authorities leave no doubt that an insurer dealing in
good faith with a competent insured will be protected against
claims grounded upon prior acts or transactions of the insured,
of which it had no notice.' The insurer is likewise protected
if, after paying the loan or surrender value to an assignee under
an assignment absolute in form, it is claimed by the beneficiary
that the assignment was for collateral purposes only.1"
Summary of the Cases
On the whole the authorities thus far may be summaried
in the words of Justice Shaw in Immel v. Travelers Insurance
Company,"' namely, that "the companies, in good faith, may
'E.g. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Ellis, 59 Ga. App.
6o8, I S.'E. (2d) 677 (I939).
I Brignola v. Prudential Ins. Co., iz N.J. Misc. 470, 17z Ad. 736
(i934.); Patten v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 192 S.Car. 189, 6 S.E. (zd)
26 (i939); Scales v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 14i S.W. (2d) 547 (Ark.,
i94o) ; Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Pac. (2d) 963 (Cal., i94o ) ;
see z WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) Sec. 433, P. 1251.
'
0 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 Fed. (2d) 781, 786 (C.C.A. 8th,
1927); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 99 Fed. (2d) i99 (C.C.A. 4 th,
1938). For a Note on Power of Pledges of Life Insurate Policy to Exercise
Surrender Options, see (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 315.
" 373 Ill. 256, z6 N.E. (2d) 114 (i94o).
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safely pay promptly to those shown by their own records to
be entitled to payment."
Lost Policies
But suppose the claimant to whom payment is made by the
insurer in good faith in reliance on its own records, is unable
to surrender the original policy which later turns up in the
hands of a former beneficiary or in the hands of one claiming
as pledgee or as assignee. Does that make a difference? May
an insurer safely issue duplicate policies? Is it under a duty
to investigate the statements made in an application or affidavit
for the issuance of a duplicate? May it endorse a change of
beneficiary on a duplicate or must it insist upon production of
the original? If it does issue a duplicate may it safely follow
through by honoring the duplicate, or does it pay at its peril
in the absence of the original policy?
According to the Restatement of Contracts "if there is [a
tangible token or writing, the surrender of which is required
by an obligor's contract for its enforcement], and the obligor
does not obtain surrender thereof, he is under a duty to render
the agreed performance in spite of a previous discharge . . . ,
to an assignee who for value in good faith, without notice of
the discharge, purchases from the obligee or from any assignee
such token or writing."'1 2 If that be taken literally it runs in
favor only of a bona fide holder who acquires the token or
writing after the obligor has paid off, and does not include a
bona fide holder who acquired the token or writing before the
obligor's payment. As there is no discernible reason for this
discrimination, I assume it was not intended and that prior as
well as subsequent assignees are covered5 but the question must
be considered open until someone undertakes to tell us authori-
tatively what the meaning is.
1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 170 (4); cf. Sec. 432. Ac-
cording to Sec. 158 (I) (b), comment a: "Surrender of a tangible token or
writing is required by the obligor's contract not only where the requirement
is stated in express terms, but also where it is a proper implication from
business usage or other surrounding circumstances."
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On its face this section of the Restatement is broad enough
to include life insurance policies, and Professor Williston ap-
pears to consider that they are included for he cites it in support
of the proposition that " . . . apart from a protecting statute,
it seems that an innocent holder for value by transfer from the
owner of such a document as a policy of insurance, a non-
negotiable bond or note, or a savings bank book, would not be
ousted of his rights by the issue of a new instrument by the
debtor even under a decree of court."' That, I take it, is
hardly debatable; but the section of the Restatement to which
he refers as authority has nothing to do with the situation
created by the mere issuance of a duplicate, but deals, rather,
with the liability of an obligor on the original document after
he has paid off without obtaining its surrender. I think we must
conclude, therefore, that, in Mr. Williston's view, an insurer
pays at its peril unless it demands and obtains surrender of the
original policy."'
Yet, in the same section of his great work, Mr. Williston
says: " . . . in the case of a non-negotiable instrument indem-
nity [to the obligor] is not a prerequisite to recovery, as for
instance a savings bank book, in an action by the owner thereof
which has been lost or destroyed."'"
It would seem to follow that an insurer cannot finally dis-
charge its obligation under a life insurance policy without
obtaining the original policy, but is' nevertheless under a duty
to pay off without surrender of the original for a judgment
13 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed., 1936) Sec. 16oo, p. 4463;
cf. Edwards v. New York Life Ins. Co., I14 S.W. (2d) 8o8 (Tenn., 1938).
4See also 6 WILLISTON, id. Secs. 1878 and 189o (".. bills of exchange..
are, indeed, mercantile specialties, being themselves obligations, not merely
evidence thereof; and the same may perhaps be said of insurance policies, . .").
Contra: New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, III U.S. 138
(1884) ("The general rule is that simple contract debts, such as a policy of
insurance not under seal, are, for the purpose of founding administration,
assets where the debtor resides, without regard to the place where the policy
is found, as this court has recently affirmed in Wyman v. Halstead, io9
U.S. 654.").
15 5 id. Sec. 16oo, p. 4462.
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will be entered against it if it doesnt--"and indemnity is not
a prerequisite to recovery." I confess I can't make that hang
together.
The cases tell a different story. There can be no recovery
on a non-negotiable instrument unless the plaintiff either pro-
duces the instrument or accounts for its absence. An unex-
plained failure to produce the original instrument, while not
the equivalent of notice of assignment, has been described as
a circumstance which should put the obligor on inquiry." But
if there is a showing that the instrument has been lost, destroyed
or is otherwise unavailable, the plaintiff may recover notwith-
standing his inability to produce and surrender it, and he is not
required to furnish indemnity."
So far as I am aware there is no dispute that a life insurance
policy is not a negotiable instrument." It ought to follow and
it does follow that absence of the policy, if reasonably accounted
for, does not bar recovery." Some cases, it is true, have sus-
tained the insurer in insisting upon surrender of the policy as
a condition of settlement," but these involved exceptional cir-
cumstances. Ordinarily, at least, it may not so insist and cer-
10 Novoprutsky v. Morris Plan Co., 319 Pa. 97, 179 Ad. zI8, 98 A.L.R.
1486 (1935). Accord: Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., z74
N.W. 232, iii A.L.R. 705 (Minn. 1937).
17 Novoprutsky v. Morris Plan Co., 319 Pa. 97, 179 Ad. z18 (1935);
see Note (1935) 98 A.L.R. 1489; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936)
Sec. I6oo, P. 4462.
"8 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 15 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass.
1936); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 Fed. (2d) 586 (C.C.A.
7th, 1937); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Pope, 68 S.W. 851 (Ky., 1902);
Smooth v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 So. 298 (La. App., 1934); Grosz
v. Grosz, 151 Or. 438, 6o Pac. (2d) 119 (1935); Immel v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 373 11. 256, 26 N.E. (2d) 114 (1940).
"' New York Life Ins. Co. v. Pope, 68 S.W. 85I (Ky., 1902); Wilcox
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 173 N.Y. 5o, 65 N.E. 857 (1903); Smooth v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 So. 298 (La. App., 1934); see Grosz v.
Grosz, 15i Or. 438, 5o Pac. (2d) 119 (I935); cf. Columbian Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. Welch, 15 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mass., 1936).
"0 Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 Fed. (2d) 573 (C.C.A. 7 th,
1939); Hatcher v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 134 Ga. 652, 68 S.E. 581
(191o); see Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W. 232,
11i A.L.R. 705 (Minn., 1937).
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tainly the weight of authority is to the effect that it need not
do so. Most of the cases turn on the customary provision for
production of the policy in connection with beneficiary changes,
policy loans and the like. It is all but uniformly held that this
requirement is for the convenience of the insurer and may be
waived by it.2 But as the insurer had paid off in these cases
without obtaining the original policy, they likewise support the
proposition that production and surrender of that instrument
to the insurer is not essential to a complete discharge.
If a life insurance policy is not negotiable (and it isn't)
"there is no reason why duplicate contracts may not be issued
as the convenence of the policyholder may require3' and dealt
with thereafter in lieu of the original, and that is precisely the
situation according to the latest judicial utterance on the
subject.2
No doubt a reasonable showing of inability to produce the
policy must be made. But there is no suggestion in any of the
cases that the insurer is under a duty to disbelieve the represen-
tations made to it for the purpose of obtaining a duplicate, and
the existence of such a duty has been expressly disavowed.23
In my view, therefore, the frequent insistence upon a bond
of indemnity as a condition either of issuing a duplicate policy
or of making settlement is unnecessary and unwarranted.24
21 Quist v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 219 Mich. 4o6, 189 N.W.
49 (1922); Dunnavant v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 67 S.W. (2d) 785
(Mo. App., 1934); Witt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 28z N.Y.
Supp 874 (1935); Shaw v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn.
633, i8z At. 472 (936); Patten v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 192
S.Car. 189, 6 S.E. (2d) 26 (939); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jokiel,
.Ill. App .......... 3o N.E. (2d) 758 (1940). Contra: Lloyd v. Royal Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 162 (N.D. Iowa, 1917).
22 Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 373 Ill. ?56, 26 N.E. (2d) 114 (1940).
23 Shaw v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 633, 18z Ad.
472 (1936); cf. Patten v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 192 S.Car. 189,
6 S.E. (2d) 26 (1939).
24 See Henley, Settlements Under Lost Policies (1923) 2 AssN. OF LIFE
INS. COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS, 209.
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Notice and Inquiry
But the insurer is protected in making payment to the per-
son shown to be entitled thereto by its own records, only if it
acts in good faith and without notice of competing or conflicting
claims. Under what circumstances, then, may an insurer be
said to have notice or to be put on inquiry? The United States
Supreme Court has said that "the means of knowledge are the
same thing in effect as knowledge itself.""5 But I know of no
case, certainly no recent case, which accepts that too-broad
generalization unqualifiedly. It would come much closer to
say that an insurer is charged with knowledge of an undisclosed
interest or adverse claim if it "knows facts which, under the
circumstances, would lead a reasonably intelligent and diligent
person to inquire... and if such inquiry, when pursued with
reasonable intelligence and diligence, would" fairly disclose
the existence of such interest or claim.2" The Supreme Court
of Alabama has laid down a test which, if it differs substantially
from that just suggested, may be regarded as somewhat more
favorable to the insurer or other obligor: "To constitute im-
puted notice, in the absence of statute, it is not enough that a
party be put on inquiry, but the facts brought to his knowledge
must be sufficient to produce reasonable conviction that such
inquiry, if followed up, would lead to knowledge of the fact.""' r
Among recent cases it has been held that (I) notice of the
insured's failing health does not put the insurer on inquiry as
to his mental capacity5 "2 (2-) the mere fact that an assignment
is to a bank is not sufficient to put the insurer on notice of the
equities of the assignori2 (3) the fact that the beneficiary is a
'.
5Wood v. Carpenter, IOI U.S. 135, 143 (1879).
The quoted language is borrowed from 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) Sec. 297, comment a.
'7 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Welch, 195 So. 554 (940).
28 Id.; see Brady, Bank Checks (2d ed., 1926) Sec. 205; but cf. Guar-
dian Life Ins. Co. v. Brackett, 27 N.E. (2d) 103 (Ind. App., i94o).
29 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 Fed. (2d) 781, 786 (C.C.A. 8th,
1927); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 99 Fed. (2d) 199 (C.C.A. 4 th,
1938).
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corporation which has paid all premiums by checks drawn on
the corporate bank account is not sufficient to put the insurer on
inquiry as to its status with respect to the policy."0 And a ver-
dict for the insurer has been sustained as against the fact that
premiums were paid by drafts drawn by it on the beneficiary
who claimed that this put the insurer on notice of his alleged
vested interest.3' It is also held that an insurer is not charged
with constructive notice of judicial proceedings.32
One typical situation perhaps calls for special attention. An
insured seeks to change the beneficiary or borrow on his policy
or take the cash value; but he cannot produce the policy; his
inability to produce it results from possession of the policy by
the beneficiary and this fact is made known to the insurer. The
beneficiary's known possession of the policy and refusal to give
it up may be considered at least suggestive of an adverse
claim;" I should so regard it. In my opinion, therefore, the
insurer cannot properly or safely proceed without giving the
beneficiary in possession an opportunity to assert any claim the
latter may have.
If the beneficiary fails to take advantage of this opportunity
I see no reason why the insurer should not issue a duplicate
policy and proceed with the transaction. No duty of inaction
rests on the insurer; it is beyond question that a beneficiary
cannot preserve his status as beneficiary simply by hanging on
to the policy."' A belated claim otherwise than as beneficiary
30 Bennett v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 220 Iowa 927, 263 N.W. 25
(1935).
"' Scales v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 141 S.W. (2d) 547 (Ark.,
1940). Accord: Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Pac. (2d) 963 (Cal.,
1940).
3 Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921);
Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 187 S.Car. 103, 196 S.E. 519
0938).
3 Cf. Novoprutsky v. Morris Plan Co., Janesville State Bank v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., both supra note 16.
34 McDonald v. McDonald, 212 Ala. 137, 102 So. 38, 36 A.L.R. 771
(1924); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 70 Cal. App. 175, 233 Pac. 343
(1924); Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Broderick, 196 Cal. 497, 238 Pac.
1034 (925); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cannon, i9% AtI. 412 (Del. Ch.
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would run afoul of the authorities denying recovery on a claim
that bobs up only after settlement. If, to avoid that, it should
be argued (as I suppose it would be) that the insurer was put on
notice before settlement by its knowledge of the beneficiary's
possession of the policy and insistence upon retaining it, the
answer is that the beneficiary was given a chance to speak and
let it pass. Surely in these circumstances such notice as the
insurer may be said to have from knowledge of possession of
the policy by the beneficiary, would be cancelled out by the
latter's silence which is at least equally persuasive of the non-
existence of a valid claim. Furthermore, in view of the failure
to speak when speaking out would have protected all con-
cerned, I think it clear an effort later on to throw the loss on
the insurer would encounter an estoppel.
Trustee Beneficiaries
An important question remains. It relates to the duty of
an insurer in the situation which arises when an insured, having
named a trustee as beneficiary, seeks to designate a substitute or
to obtain the cash or loan value of his policy. Being apprised of
the existence of a trust by the description of the beneficiary as
trustee,1 must the insurer examine and interpret the trust
instrument at its peril?
According to the United States District Court at Philadel-
1937); Kavanagh v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 238 Ill. App. 72
(gz5); Farley v. First Nat. Bank, 250 Ky. I5o, 6I S.W. (2d) 1059
(1933); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cook, 237 Mich. 303, zlI N.W. 648
(1927); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jedynak, 25o Mich. 88, 229
N.W. 413 (930); Fisher v. Fisher, 262 Mich. 100, 247 N.W. iI (1933);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 50 S.W. (2d) 765 (Mo. App. 1932); Phila-
delphia Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney, 117 N.J. Eq. 448, 176 AtI. 166 (1935);
Lahey v. Lahey, 174 N.Y. 146, 66 N.E. 670 (1903); Moskowitz v. Equit-
able Life Assur. Soc., 297 N.Y. Supp. 45 (1937); Kelley v. Kelley, 14 N.Y.
Supp. (2d) 545 (i939); Gannon v. Gannon, 88 Pa. Super Ct. z39 (1926);
Wyatt v. Wyatt, 63 S. (2nd) z68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); cf. Krajewski
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 54 R.I. 267, 17z At. 396 (1934).
'- See z RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 297, comment d; 2 SCOTT,
TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 297.3, p. 1134; but cf. In re Goldowitz' Will, z59 N.Y.
Supp. 900, 906 (1932).
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phia an insured designating as beneficiary one who is a trustee,
does not by that act alone lose the power to change the bene-
ficiary even though the trust, as distinguished from the desig-
nation of beneficiary, is irrevocable. 6 I take it that Professor
Scott agrees with that view for the discussion of insurance trusts
in his recent work seems to assume, if not expressly to state,
that the designation of a trustee as beneficiary is subject to
change (the power to do so being reserved in the notice to the
insurer) notwithstanding the trust, as such, is irrevocable."
That this must be so follows, I think, from this, that the com-
plex of rights, privileges, powers and immunities arising from
the designation of a beneficiary is precisely the same in every
case. At least I am unable to perceive on what ground it could
be held that the act of designating a beneficiary has any dif-
ferent legal consequences when the beneficiary named is a
trustee.
I submit, therefore, that reservation of power to substitute
a new beneficiary of the policy, in place of a trustee previously
named, is wholly consistent with irrevocability of the trust.
If that be so, then, as a matter of logic, there would appear
to be no reason for imposing a special duty on the insurer with
respect to policies made payable to a beneficiary as trustee. It
is possible in any case that some act or transaction of the insured,
unknown to the company, has changed his legal relations with
respect to his policy, as regards third persons. In cases not
involving trustee beneficiaries no duty to attempt to ferret out
and bring to light such possible alterations is imposed in the
absence of suspicious circumstances brought home to the insurer.
I see no logical ground for holding otherwise merely because
the beneficiary, as beneficiary, is a trustee.
And since the mere designation, without more, of a trustee
as beneficiary is in no way inconsistent with power on the part
of the insured to make the policy payable to another, whether
36 Sussman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 88 (I94O).
37 i ScoTT, TRUSTS (I939) Sec. 84.1, p. 458.
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or not the trust itself be irrevocable, it hardly can be said, I
think, that knowledge of the existence of the trust is a sus-
picious circumstance requiring investigation.
Why should there be a duty to investigate when the bene-
ficiary is known to be a trustee if there is no such duty (and it
has been held that there is none3") in the case of an assignment,
absolute in form, to a bank? Certainly the chance that an assign-
ment to a bank, although absolute in form, was given for
collateral purposes only is at least as great as the chance that
a trust instrument will turn out to contain provisions tying the
hands of the insured who, so far as the insurer is concerned, has
reserved full control over his policy. If the insurer is under
no duty to investigate notwithstanding its knowledge that
premiums have been paid by the beneficiary (and it has been
held it is not3") why should it be under a duty to investigate
merely because the beneficiary happens to be a trustee? Ordi-
narily, I should suppose, the beneficiary does not pay premiums
without what appears to the beneficiary, at least, to be satis-
factory assurance that he will enjoy the fruits of the policy. Of
course, that is not always so and in any event what the bene-
ficiary relies on may be without legal significance. If in the
one case the circumstances do not put the insurer on inquiry,
I see no reason why they should in the other.
It is beyond question, of course, that "a third person has
notice of a breach of trust not only when he knows of the
breach, but also when he should know of it; that is, when he
knows facts which under the circumstances would lead a reas-
onably intelligent and diligent person to inquire whether the
trustee is a trustee and whether he is committing a breach of
trust, and if such inquiry when pursued with reasonable intelli-
gence and diligence would give him knowledge or reason to
3 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, New York Life Ins Co. v. Brown,
both supra note 29.
" Bennett v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra note 30; Scales v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., both supra
note 3 1.
396 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1941
know that the trustee is committing a breach of trust."4 One
who goes ahead regardless must take the consequences.
But I point out an obvious distinction. The problem in
hand does not concern the liability of one dealing with a trustee,
for the insured is not the trustee. He is, generally, the settlor.4 '
Nor is the insurer in the position ordinarily occupied by a third
person who, normally, is free to deal or not as he sees fit. The
insurer, on the contrary, has assumed contractual obligations
which it is called upon to fulfill-called upon by its own policy-
holder, the party with whom it has contracted, who, in his
dealings with the insurer, has stipulated expressly that he is
and remains free to demand full performance of what the
insurer has bound itself to do. Consequently the authorities
having to do with the liability of a third person who freely
deals with a trustee are beside the point. Certainly they do
not foreclose the question here under consideration.
With that question no case, so far as I am aware, has yet
dealt. It has, however, elicited a considerable diversity of
professional opinion.42
Nor am I able to discern any considerations of policy which
should impel the courts to impose a duty upon an insurer (the
beneficiary being a trustee) to review and interpret at its peril
the teims and conditions of the trust instrument. To do so
would impose a considerable burden on insurers which, in the
long run, must to some extent increase the cost of insurance. It
40 7 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) Sec. 297, comment a.
41 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) Sec. 84.1, p. 458.4 2 See HORTON, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS
(1927); Voorhees, Some Legal Problems Involved in the Life Insurance
Trust (1928) PROCEEDINGS, LEGAL SECTION, AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION,
122; Report of Committee to Recommend Beneficiary Clause for Use in
Naming a Corporate Trustee and statement thereon by H. B. Arnold, id.
287-296; SEARS, Practical Problems in Handling Life Insurance Trusts and
ensuing discussion (1930) id. 194-211; PETERSON, The Assignment Route
or Beneficiary Route to Life Insurance Trusts and ensuing discussion (193)
id. 58-88; WRIGHT, Designation of a Trustee as Beneficiary (1930) 4 AssN.
OF LIFE INSURANCE COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS, 521; Yost, Some Problems
Relating to Life Insurance Trusts (i93o) id. 567; HANNA, Some Legal
Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346.
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likewise would tend to delay and hinder transactions which it
is sometimes necessary to conclude promptly if they are to be
concluded at all. There can be no doubt that now and again
it would serve to protect the beneficiaries of the trust. But the
question may fairly be asked whether these cases would be
numerous enough to compensate for the delay, inconvenience
and expense that would result in almost all cases. It is my
guess that the imposition of such a duty would be helpful in
a negligible number of the total cases involved. Certainly it
is true that in most cases the policy, once made payable to a
trustee, is deposited with the latter so that improper dealings
with it thereafter can hardly result without participation by the
trustee as well as the insured. I am prepared to believe that
will happen with relative infrequency. "Wise rules," said
Chief Justice Taft, "are not made by exceptions."
The existence of a duty to investigate the terms of the trust
would entail a further disadvantage from the point of view of
the insured, the settlor, as well as the insurer. In practice the
insured is altogether likely to regard the trust instrument as
a confidential matter. Not infrequently he is outraged by a
demand for authority to inspect it or for a copy; this he resents
as an invasion of his privacy. An unhappy state of affairs may
result if the insurer makes a point of the matter.
In this situation some life insurance companies follow the
practice of requiring and accepting a statement from the trustee
summarizing the relevant provisions of the trust or simply
declaring that nothing in it prevents the insured from dealing
with the policy at his pleasure.
That procedure seems to me to recognize the existence of
a duty of inquiry and simultaneously to disregard it. It may
have some practical advantages but surely it affords no legal
protection. For if there be a duty of inquiry in the circum-
stances, its purpose is to guard against a possible breach of trust.
That purpose assuredly is not served by relying on the word
and the judgment of the trustee on the very point at issue.
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Assuming the existence of such a duty nothing short of an
inspection of the trust instrument or a properly authenticated
copy, as I see it, would suffice, if the instrument is available.
If it is not available it can only be because of a refusal to pro-
duce it. That, I should say, might well be considered a sus-
picious circumstance putting the insurer on notice even though
(as it seems to me) no duty of inquiry existed initially.
Finally, the duty of the trustee beneficiary must not be
overlooked, as it appears to me it has been. A "trustee is under
a duty . . . to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property5
and if the trustee has greater skill than that of a man of ordi-
nary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill as he
has."4 By that test, I submit, a trustee must be held guilty of
negligence in failing to advise the insurer of any restrictions on
the insured's freedom to deal with the policy, contained in the
trust instrument; and at least one court has so characterized
the trustee's inaction.44
Thus the area of possible loss to the beneficiaries of the
trust is further contracted if the trustee is able to respond in
damages, which should ordinarily be the case as most trustee
beneficiaries are banks or trust companies.
I therefore venture the opinion that no duty of investiga-
tion rests upon an insurer with respect to a policy made payable
to a trustee which would not rest upon it if the beneficiary were
not a trust.
Knowledge of Agents
Of course an insurer is very largely at the mercy of its
agency force in this matter of notice but that is by no means
characteristic of the present subject and I therefore treat it
briefly. It is held with considerable uniformity that notice to
a minor clerical employee or mere soliciting agent is ordinarily
43 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (i935) sec. 174.
"Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 373 Ill. 256, 26 N.E. (2d) I14 (1940);
cf. i RESTATEMENT TRUSTS (935) Sec. 205, illustrations I to 7, ind.
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not enough." Indeed, it has been said that knowledge other-
wise sufficient to put the insurer on inquiry is insufficient unless
given to or acquired by an agent having power to act for the
insurer with respect to the very transaction in hand." On the
whole, however, I rather think the companies should be pre-
pared to accept accountability for knowledge brought home to
any employee whose duties include the servicing of policies,
although without authority to make decisions himself." I have
no doubt that is true if the employee is above the rank of
soliciting agent."5
Conclusion
No attempt has been made to cover all of the questions in
the field I have tried to survey. The opinions expressed on
controversial aspects are submitted with all deference for what
they may be worth. This paper will have served its purpose if
the material here collected and discussed (and there is no pre-
tense that all of the authorities have been brought together)
proves of some use in the actual handling of the problems
involved.
"5 Brignola v. Prudential Ins. Co., iz N.J. Misc. 470, 172 Ad. 736
(1934); Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 Pac. (zd) 963 (Cal., 1940);
see z CoucH, INSURANCE (1929) Sec. 525 b, p. 155; 6 id. (1930) Sec.
1458 m, p. 5227.
4 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, i Fed. (2d) 781, 788 (C.C.A.
8th, 1927).
4 Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 113 Fed. (2d) 974 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1940).
' Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1O3 Pac. (zd) 963 (Cal. 1940).
